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1. Introduction
As a result of the biolog-
ical nature of agricultural
production processes and
their strong dependency on
natural and climatic condi-
tions, forms of public inter-
vention aimed at reducing
income variability, with no
parallels in other sectors of
the economy, have been in
place in developed countries
for several decades. Without
neglecting the peculiarities
of the production conditions
in agriculture, farming in de-
veloped countries has indu-
bitably reached high levels
of complexity. Both the ori-
gins of income variability
and its impact on the viabil-
ity of farms have radically
changed (Meuwissen et al.,
2008).
The organization of agri-
cultural production, its inte-
gration in the agro-food
chain, increased use of
credit, professional techni-
cal assistance, finance and
insurance services by farm-
ers, the regulatory system
within which it operates and
the diversification of income are all factors that make the risk
faced by a farmer in a developed economy in 2012 very dif-
ferent and more complex than that faced by his father on the
same farm only few
decades ago. 
In this scenario, we need
to take into account the im-
pact on the sector of
greater future volatility in
food markets. Climatic in-
stability will translate into
high crop yield variability,
heightening tensions in the
markets. As a result, the
frequency of price shocks
may well increase, thereby
raising farmers’ exposure
to income risk and leading
to farm closures (Capi-
tanio, 2010). This eventu-
ality is not only bound to
squeeze farm yield poten-
tials, but also to favour
conditions for a withdraw-
al of environmental and
social conservation func-
tions from huge acreages
of rural and agricultural
land world-wide. The re-
markable variations ob-
served in agricultural com-
modity prices over the last
few years is the demonstra-
tion that we are heading to-
wards a scenario of greater
uncertainties, which are in-
evitably reflected in mar-
ket trends (Trostle, 2008).
Since market stabilization was one of the founding objec-
tives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), it may be ar-
gued that the increased market price volatility could affect
farmers’ revenues both in terms of level and stability. There-
fore, public intervention in supporting risk management poli-
cies in agriculture, aimed at protecting farmers’ crop revenues
both from price volatility and falling yields, would become a
desirable policy objective. Two main instruments usually
contribute to risk management: European payments and
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crop insurance. As a result, they must be considered jointly in
order to study their specific effect on income returns and
volatility (Hauser et al., 2004; Vedenov and Power, 2008;
Capitanio et al., 2011).
Farm income stabilization has traditionally been a great
concern for European agricultural policy makers. Since the
setting up of the CAP, income stabilization has been achieved
mostly indirectly, through various price support mechanisms
included in almost all Common Market Organizations (C-
MOs). With the gradual abandonment of price support that
has followed the CAP reform process from Agenda 2000, the
responsibility for smoothing any income fluctuations is being
transferred more and more to the farmers or to Member S-
tates’ policies, although the introduction of the Single Pay-
ment Scheme (since 2007), by providing farmers with a fixed
amount, could partly contribute to stabilizing total farm in-
comes (Cafiero et al., 2007). 
At the European level, the review of risk management tools
has proceeded in parallel with that of the path of reform of the
CAP, and, in particular, with the new structure of direct pay-
ments launched under the 2003 Medium-Term Reform. An
initial analysis of the risk management tools in this regard was
conducted in 2001 (European Commission, 2001), the reform
itself being accompanied by an exhortation to examine the
role attributed to specific measures of risk coverage together
with a Communication from the Commission “on risk and cri-
sis management” (European Commission, 2005).
The first concrete initiative arrives, however, only with the
2008 Health Check which allowed the Member States a fi-
nancial contribution from the EU towards the premiums on
insurance taken out against economic losses caused by ad-
verse climatic events and animal or plant diseases or pest in-
festation and to promote farmers’ membership of mutual
funds with the same aims.
Today, in a scenario in which the theme of volatility in agri-
cultural markets is newly centre-stage on the political agenda
and on the eve of a new CAP reform, a review of risk manage-
ment tools is assuming greater relevance. The proposed regu-
lations covering rural development for the period 2014-2020
confirm the possibility for Member States to co-finance premi-
ums for insurance policies and to promote participation in mu-
tual funds, with the added possibility of activating income sta-
bilization tools to be pursued through the use of mutual funds.
In parallel with European payments, insurance offers a way
to protect the farmer against large yield variations. The con-
tracts basically offer coverage if the yield falls below a thresh-
old defined in the contract. Crop insurance is likely to have
been providing significant income stabilization over the years
(Bielza et al., 2009). However, it cannot be expected to pro-
vide effective protection against income fluctuations due to
price instability. Income or revenue insurance offers a real op-
portunity to manage risk at the farm scale (Mahul, 2003;
Mishra and Goodwin, 2003; Shnitckey et al., 2003). Yet, such
products are not well developed in Europe despite many ef-
forts in this direction (Meuwissen et al., 2003).
Despite the importance of crop insurance capacity and Eu-
ropean payments to reduce income volatility, few studies have
been carried out on this topic until now (Vedenov and Power,
2008). Both mechanisms provide a sort of certainty for farm-
ers which should encourage them to continue their activity.
The aim of this paper is therefore to measure the extent to
which crop insurance and CAP payments significantly reduce
volatility in farmers’ crop revenues. Moreover, our analysis
also considers other risk management tools that can contribute
to facing up the challenge of income volatility, while allowing
for the definition of a methodology of risk-management tools
in agriculture according to their effect on income return and
volatility and the timing of their use.
To address this research topic, we focused our analysis on
crop income instead of farm revenue for one main reason. S-
ince both crop insurance schemes and European payments are
based on farmers’ past physical production, we argued that
analysing the overall farm revenue could mislead the explana-
tion of the empirical results. This point is one of the most
salient specificities of our paper as all articles cited above refer
to overall farm income. Examining crop income allows us to
precisely study a level of revenue that is independent from Eu-
ropean payments or insurance indemnities. It corresponds to
the income exclusively linked to production. In doing so, we do
not underestimate that in many cases there is a range of differ-
ent revenue-generating activities on the farms in question, (e.g.
work outside the farm), which, among other things, negatively
affect the farmers crop insurance demand (Jetté-Nantel et al.,
2010; Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Poon and Weersink, 2011).
Our empirical model for farmers is located in France and in
Italy. These two European countries present similarities and
specificities that make the comparison relevant. Firstly,
France and Italy benefit from the same system of European
payments, which are decoupled and depend on the area under
cultivation and the type of production. Secondly, both in
France and in Italy, the insurance system has essentially been
private since 2005 while it used to take the form of a public
fund in the years prior to that. Starting from this institutional
framework, Italian and French farms present different struc-
tures both in terms of their cultivated area, being smaller for
the Italian ones, and in terms of production, because Italian
farms are more intensive than their French counterparts. In
other words, these two countries are somewhat comparable
but have specificities: that is the reason why we have to per-
form separate analyses for each of them. 
We use survey data drawn up from the Farm Accountancy
Data Network (FADN), selecting only farmers that had con-
tinuously belonged to the sample from 2003 to 2007. The
sample included 2,998 farmers for France and 6,557 for Italy,
representing a total of 47,775 observations. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first empirical analysis in this strand of lit-
erature in Europe that makes use of such a large data set. To
carry out our analysis, we used three econometric models
specifically aimed at capturing farmers’ income returns for
both countries, using 1) balanced panel data, 2) increases or
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decreases in crop income using a logistic model, and 3)
overall volatility in farmers’ crop revenue by using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section
provides a debate of the typologies of the tools that are main-
ly used by farmers to manage their volatility. Section 3 intro-
duces the empirical analysis, providing full details on the
sample characteristics in terms of the variables used together
with the descriptive statistics and the econometric models that
we implemented. Section 4 presents the results and section 5
offers some concluding remarks. 
2. A typology of risk management tools em-
ployed in agriculture
Over the years, many tools have been used for the manage-
ment of risks in agriculture: starting from a diversification of
activities to the development of financial tools. The aim of this
section is to propose a typology that takes two dimensions into
account: the use of risk management tools on returns and
volatility in farmers’ incomes as well as the timing of their use.
This typology provides a framework for the choice of factors
affecting returns and volatility. More precisely, we specifically
consider crop income, that is to say the income only resulting
from production and therefore independent of any receipt of
European payments and insurance claims. This is a key point s-
ince it puts the role of European payments and decisions re-
garding insurance on the resulting production into perspective.
Crop income is suited because we can measure the direct im-
pact of factors affecting its level and its volatility.
2.1. Returns and volatility effects of risk man-
agement tools
Following the usual distinction in finance theory, a farmer’s
yield is a random variable that can be described according to
its return and its volatility. In fact, risk management aims both
at securing and stabilizing the expected return. As a result, we
shall separate tools that play a direct influence on yield levels
from those which are aimed at reducing its volatility.
As indicated in the introduction to this section, a well-
known way to reduce volatility is to diversify activities. To do
so, the farmer can use a three-stage plan (Wu, 1999), firstly
choosing the repartition of his working time between the farm
and external activities (Jetté-Nantel et al., 2010; Mishra and
Goodwin, 1997; Poon and Weersink, 2011). Secondly, within
the farm, he chooses his specialization: for instance breeding
animals, crops or a mix. Thirdly, and finally, within the crop-
ping, he defines his crop planning, i.e. the number and variety
of the crops, taking into account his capacity to irrigate some
of them. In this way, the farmer has diversified before the sea-
son begins, reducing volatility in yields.
In addition, the farmer can complement the management of
revenue volatility using insurance policies, the aim of which
is to compensate physical losses due to natural disasters. In
essence, the insurance policy compensates crop yield deficits
by providing the payment of an indemnity over a certain
threshold of losses. Multi-peril crop insurance is now avail-
able in many developed countries, including France and Italy
(Enjolras et al., 2012). Alternatively, crop-revenue insurance
protects from deviations in the farmer’s revenue. This type of
contract is well developed in the United States whereas it is
not as widespread in Europe (Bielza et al., 2009).
Some financial policies also contribute to decreasing yield
volatility. Futures contracts allow the farmer to hedge price
risk before the season (Mahul, 2003; Garcia and Leuthold,
2004). Recently, there has been a huge growth of trading vol-
umes in securities based on agricultural commodities, with
the number of futures and options increasing five-fold be-
tween 2000 and 2010 (Piot-Lepetit and M’Barek, 2011).
Some alternatives to financial markets exist that can help re-
duce volatility. Membership in a group of farms (a legal form)
provides better market power for purchasing and selling com-
modities (Kyriakopoulos, 1997). Forward contracting guaran-
tees the farmer to sell his crops at a price that is less depend-
ent on market fluctuations (Velandia et al., 2009). Finally, the
farmer can use inputs such as pesticides to protect his yields
against diseases and external attacks.
European payments are a way to substantially increase farm
returns, providing a sort of certainty equivalent. Most of them
are decoupled from production and linked to crop rotation and
cropping area. As a result, they represent a guarantee in all cir-
cumstances. The farmer can also increase his return using in-
puts such as fertilizers that stimulate the development of the
plants.
2.2. The timing of risk management tools
The timing of the use of each kind of tool is essential as it
determines the strategy used by each farmer at the start of the
season and the monitoring of this strategy during the course
of the farming year. Firstly, the farmer determines the basic
structure of the production he will put into effect. Simultane-
ously, he chooses how or whether to insure his future produc-
tion (Wu, 1999). He can also anticipate the amount of EU
payments he will receive. A part of the structure of the farm is
predetermined when one takes into account the situation over
previous seasons such as past investments and past payments. 
During the season, the farmer is constrained by most of his
initial choices but he can adapt his strategy, taking into account
external factors such as the climate or commodity markets
(Serra et al., 2005). Weather influences the use of inputs in-
cluding pesticides which maintain yields in the face of pests
and diseases while fertilizers contribute to increasing crop
yields (Babcock and Blackmer, 1994; Hall and Norgaard,
1974). The farmer can also decide to spread the sales of its pro-
duction according to the prices on the markets (Velandia et al.,
2009). This adaptive management contributes to providing the
farmer with some flexibility. An insured farmer also receives
indemnities if his production is severely compromised. 
As a result, the farmer takes decisions sequentially, at a
specific moment. Therefore, most of the choices are not si-
multaneous. This has many implications, especially in
terms of econometric modeling. For instance, the use of si-
multaneous equations is inappropriate and endogeneity can be
corrected using the timing of the risk management decisions.
Table 1 shows the typology of risk management tools con-
sidering only the direct effects of the strategy and monitoring
of the farmer’s yields. It provides a dynamic overview of the
farmer’s capacities to manage his risk. Indirect effects, such as
an additional wealth resulting from insurance claims, are ran-
dom. As a result, they can only be taken into account at the
end of the season.
3. Empirical framework
3.1. The data
Within Europe, France and Italy are two major agricultural
countries. Both have benefited from the CAP and have also
encouraged the development of crop insurance, beginning
with (public) solidarity funds, the systems later being changed
to private and subsidized insurance for most crops. As a result,
French and Italian farms are fairly equal with regard to their
institutional frameworks. In this context, a direct comparison
of the behaviours might be possible, taking into account the
structures and productions of the respective farms.
We use a survey of farmers in France and Italy be-
longing to the Farm Accountancy Data Network
(FADN-RICA). This sample offers a reliable way to
access the structural and financial characteristics of
professional farms, providing useful information on
their balance sheets. It is then possible to identify s-
trategies farmers use to cope with risk (Phimister et
al., 2004).
Within the original databases, we selected only
farms that had continuously belonged to the sample
between 2003 and 2007. Our sample finally included
9,555 farms for each year, of which 2,998 are French
and 6,557 Italian, providing a total of 47,775 sets of
farm data over the 5-year period in question.
3.2. The variables
In the following subsections, we present the main
variables that enter into the analysis. The details are
given in Table 2. We focus specifically on the ways to
measure volatility and on the tools used to hedge that
volatility.
3.2.1. Measure of farm income volatility
As stated before, the reference used for the computations is
that of income from crop production (y
i
) as it provides the re-
turn specifically linked to this activity whilst avoiding consid-
ering diversification resulting from activities outside the farm.
Following the literature and public reports (Cordier et al.,
2008; Dunn et al., 2000; OECD, 2000), we can consider two
measures for volatility:
1. The growth rate (∆
y
) between each year, with ∆
y
=
(y
N
– y
N-1
)/y
N-1
2. The standard deviation (σ
y
) over the period 2003-2007.
3.2.2. Risk management tools
Our models include many risk management tools used by
French and Italian farmers. The farmer first makes some
structural choices and can choose the rotation. In doing so, he
diversifies his activities and reduces variance in his income
(Purdy et al., 1997). As far as his crop selection is concerned,
he can plan the irrigation of part of his land in order to protect
his crops in the case of drought (Dalton et al., 2004). 
Farmers can also take into consideration the sum of the Eu-
ropean payments they receive, the amount corresponding to a
direct wealth effect (Hennessy, 1998; Sckokai and Moro,
2006). The effect of these payments may be ambivalent. On
the one hand, the farmer can use them to invest and increase
his productive capacity. Thus, he might increase his income
and the risk he takes. On the other hand, the farmer can use
this additional money as a substitute for his activity. In that
case, crop income and risk may decrease.
Insurance is another key indicator. We take into account
the farmer’s decision to insure or not, i.e. to take out poli-
cies sold by private insurance companies. Insurance deci-
sions may prove costly, depending on the size of any pre-
miums (Enjolras and Sentis, 2011). In addition to this crite-
Table 2 - List of variables and summary statistics.
Table 1 - Typology of risk management tools in agriculture.
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rion, we measure insurance profitability, this being the differ-
ence between claims and premiums. A positive sum should be
correlated to lower volatility (Coble and Knight, 2002).
The farmer can also use inputs, such as pesticides and fer-
tilizers for the protection and/or growth of his crops
(Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1994). Pesticides should reduce
income volatility while fertilizers should increase the returns.
The FADN-RICA database does not provide access to some
strategies used by farmers such as forward and future con-
tracting or spread selling. This represents one of the limita-
tions of the database.
3.2.3. Structural and financial characteristics of the
farm
The size of the farm, either measured by its total area or the
area under cultivation, plays a direct role in the determination
of the return. One can also expect that larger
farms are more able to diversify their crops than
the smaller ones (Penrose, 1959).
Even if some farms cultivate many crops, most
of them are specialized. We can therefore identify
some differences between the various farm out-
puts while considering their Economic and Tech-
nical Orientation (ETO). We differentiate 5 main
ETOs: field-scale crops, vineyards and wine pro-
duction, market-gardening, herbivore breeding
and other farm outputs so as to identify different
behaviours among the sectors (Cordier et al.,
2008). 
Farms can join together to form a group to be
able to make economies of scale and increase
their bargaining power (Marcus and Frederick,
1994). This strategy should lead to better returns
and lower volatility.
Finally, we examine an essential parameter of
the farm’s financial situation, its level of debt
measured by the financial leverage or debt-to-as-
sets ratio. Leveraged farms are exposed to a high-
er probability of default. As a result, they may
adopt a more cautious strategy (Purdy et al.,
1997).
3.2.4. Control variables
Weather plays a direct role in crop income
volatility (Chmielewski and Kohn, 1999). Annual
temperature and precipitations are measured for
each year and analysed at a locality level. We then
take into account the original values observed
each year and their absolute deviations from the
mean to measure their impact on returns and
volatility.
Some farms are located in less-favoured areas,
corresponding to high altitudes, steep terrain or e-
conomically-depressed regions. As a result of
these constraints, their returns are likely to be
lower and their volatility higher.
We have chosen to introduce a dummy for each year. These
indicators should reveal a systematic component of yield vari-
ation among farmers. Finally, we take into account the
farmer’s age. We use two measures: age and age-squared so
as to control for an experience effect of the farmer.
3.2.5. Standardization of data
As the size of the farm may influence the level of return and
volatility (σ or ∆), it would appear necessary to control its in-
fluence on the other variables, most of those employed in the
models being standardized, by dividing them by the total farm
area. 
Not all of the variables identified above could be considered
in the models because of endogeneity. We can identify a s-
trategic behaviour when considering irrigated area, special-
ization, crop diversification and insurance which are chosen
Table 2 - List of variables and summary statistics (continued).
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simultaneously by the farmer to reduce risk before the grow-
ing season begins. This behaviour has an impact both on these
variables and crop incomes, the latter being our dependent
variable. Because of the interaction between exogenous vari-
ables, we decided to consider only the variable related to in-
surance as it is chosen at the beginning of the season while
crop income is observed at the end.
3.3. The models
Using our dataset, we develop three kinds of model that aim
to measure the influence of farm structure on crop income re-
turns, on its volatility and the growth of farm returns over the
period. All analyses have been performed for the two coun-
tries, France and Italy, to highlight their specificities.
We group our main variables into items regarding their in-
fluence on crop return: (1) risk management tools (EU pay-
ments and insurance), (2) structural and financial characteris-
tics of the farm, and (3) control variables. The measure of the
variables considered for each of these items may differ be-
tween models (original values, growth rate or standard devia-
tion). This point will be discussed while presenting the mod-
els and the dependent variables.
3.3.1. Relationship between income returns and risk
management tools
To measure the impact of management factors on crop in-
come returns, we have considered the whole period, from
2003 to 2007. More precisely, we performed a panel analysis
with random effect, on balanced panel data, to consider both
the individual and the temporal effect. In fact, because our
sample is not exhaustive, we chose to perform a random ef-
fect model (Nerlove, 2003;Trognon, 2003). Moreover, the
size of the sample and the existence of a location effect con-
firm this choice. We carried out heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation tests (Wooldridge, 2002). 
As the model explains the level of crop income per hectare1,
some exogenous variables are considered in their raw form,
i.e. without undergoing any transformation. The model con-
sidered is the following:
(1) y
it
= α + β’R
it
+ γ’S
it
+ δ’C
it
+ ε
it
Where: y
it
is crop income per hectare, α is the constant, R
it
is the matrix of risk management tools, S
it
is the matrix of
structural and financial characteristics of the farm, C
it
are con-
trol variables and ε
it
are error terms.
3.3.2. Relationship between income variability and
risk management tools
The second model is a discrete regression model. The aim
is to understand factors that lead to a positive growth rate of
crop income. We distinguish positive and negative growth
rates that are calculated as the variability of crop income ob-
served for each farm between 2 years (∆). Because of the di-
chotomous format of the dependent variable, we performed a
logit model. The reason is the closer approximation between
the logistic distribution and the standard normal distribution
(Amemiya, 1981; Maddala, 1989). 
The latent variable ∆y
i
is continuous. The estimated model
measuring the impact of factors that bring about an increase
in income between 2004 and 2007 is the following:
(2) ∆y
i
= α + β’∆R
i
+ γ’S
i
+ δ’C
i
+ ε
i
Where: ∆y
i
denotes a growth in crop income per hectare, α
is the constant, ∆R
i
is the matrix of the variability of risk man-
agement tools, S
i
is the matrix of structural and financial char-
acteristics of the farm, C
i
are control variables and ε
i
are error
terms.
3.3.3. Relationship between income volatility and
risk management tools
The third model considers the volatility of crop income.
Variables identified for item 1 and item 2 are now considered
in terms of volatility over the period 2003-2007 (σ). More
precisely, we defined the logarithm of this volatility for the
dependent variable. In fact, we observed that the variance of
the income increases with the income. The log-transformation
is then used to stabilize the variance (Heij et al., 2004).
(3) Log(σ
yi
) = α + β’σ
Ri
+ γ’S
i
+ δ’C
i
+ ε
i
Where σ
yi
denotes the volatility of crop income per hectare,
α is the constant, σ
Ri
is the matrix of the volatility of risk man-
agement tools, S
i
is the matrix of structural and financial char-
acteristics of the farm, C
i
are control variables and ε
i
are error
terms.
4. The results
In this section, we interpret the results of the models de-
tailed above for French and Italian farms.
4.1. Summary statistics
Summary statistics are given in Table 2. Farms present
rather different characteristics depending on their country. In
Italy, their size is smaller than in France both in terms of total
area and turnover2. They make more use of risk management
tools (crop diversification, EU payments, pesticides and fer-
tilizers). This leads to a larger crop income compared to
France, which is also less volatile over the period 2003-2007.
It may signify that risk management is successful in Italy.
Conversely, French farms are larger but they benefit from a
less favourable crop income per hectare, probably as a result
of a decreasing marginal productivity. In line with a lower use
of management tools, they exhibit a higher volatility in their
returns. This having been said, they have benefitted from a
significant growth rate in income. Thus, taking risk appears to
be a winning strategy over the period.
One should also note that indebtedness is similar between
the two countries while insurance is not profitable, espe-
cially for Italian farms.
1 1 hectare (denoted ha) is equal to 2.47 acres.
2 Farms are considered as professional if their gross standard mar-
gin is higher than E4,800 in Italy and E9,600 in France.
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4.2. Relationship between income return and
risk management tools
The panel-data analysis explains the level of crop income
per hectare through the main factors we identified in the pre-
vious section. The results are summarized in Table 3.
We observed that EU payments benefit Italian farms as they
are considered as an additional income, whereas French farm-
ers seem to substitute subsidies with production. 
The same relationship exists with insurance, leading to a
higher crop income per hectare in Italy. This could be ex-
plained by a strategic behaviour aimed at securing production.
However, insurance profitability (i.e. the difference between
claims and premiums) only has a significant and positive im-
pact on crop income for French producers. 
As far as inputs are concerned, the model highlights a pos-
itive impact on crop income for both France and Italy. In the-
ory fertilizers should increase crop income while pesticides
should reduce its volatility. Results show that both fertilizers
and pesticides lead to increased crop income.
A farm’s structure plays a role in the level of crop income in
both countries. Total area and crop income are negatively
linked but there is a threshold above which the effect is the op-
posite. This refers to decreasing returns.
Climatic constraints do not seem to affect Italian crop in-
comes while French farms appear to be more sensitive in
terms both of precipitation and temperature changes in which
a higher temperature leads to a lower crop income per hectare.
Beyond these effects, the model highlights specific features
of some types of farming. In France, wine-growing is associ-
ated with a higher crop income while the contrary is the case
for market garden production3, while in Italy, the results show
that market garden production is associated with a higher lev-
el of crop income.
The final difference between French and Italian farms is
that of the time effect. In Italy, it would appear that farmers
maintain the same crop income per hectare over the years,
while the factor seems to be more volatile in France.
4.3. Relationship between income variability
and risk management tools
While the previous model explains the level of crop income
per hectare, this second one attempts to identify and evaluate
3 Site of the French Agricultural Ministry: http://agreste.agriculture.
gouv.fr/definitions/otex-mbs/
Table 3 - Panel data regressions explaining crop income return.
Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: own elaboration, FADN 2003-2007.
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Table 4 - Logistic regressions explaining a positive growth rate in
crop income.
Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: own elaboration, FADN 2003-2007.
factors leading to a positive growth rate for crop income. The
growth rate (∆) is computed for each farm and between each
period. We then classify the farms according to its sign. The re-
sults are summarized in Table 4.
The results show that the turnover has a positive effect on the
probability of having a positive growth rate of crop income for
Italian farmers while it has no effect for their French counter-
parts. In Italy, we observe that an increase in the growth rate for
EU payments per hectare has a positive effect on the probabil-
ity considered; it seems to go hand in hand with the results ob-
served in the first model that highlighted the positive relation-
ship between the amount per hectare of EU payments and the
level of crop income. EU payments again appear to stimulate
crop production in Italy.
With regard to insurance, the first model indicates that in-
sured French farmers did not benefit from a higher return.
However, the second model proves they have a higher proba-
bility of increasing their crop income over time. The situation
is the opposite in Italy where insured farmers benefit from a
higher income but the growth in this income is as stable as that
for non-insured farmers.
Use of inputs does not significantly influence the probability
of increasing crop income, either for pesticides or fertilizers.
The model also emphasizes the sensitivity of French farmers
to deviations in climate. There also exist some specificities
with regard to the type of farm. For instance, market gardeners
have a lower probability of obtaining a positive growth rate in
crop income if they are operating in France.
Being located in a less-favoured area leads to a lower proba-
bility of income growth in France whereas it does not nega-
tively affect crop income whereas in Italy, such a location does
not seem to play a role either in the level of crop income or on
the probability of obtaining higher growth.
4.4. Relationship between income volatility and
risk management tools
The third model brings a viewpoint that is complementary to
the first two, focusing on the volatility of crop income, ex-
plained as the standard deviation of its return (σ) over the peri-
od 2003-2007. The results are summarized in Table 5.
The results demonstrate similarities between France and I-
taly. More volatile EU payments lead to increased crop income
volatility. This emphasizes the close link between changes in
EU support and the risk associated to the farmer’s income.
Being insured increases the volatility of crop income in both
countries, suggesting a moral hazard effect. We also note that
the volatility of insurance profitability has a positive effect on
French crop income volatility while the opposite effect is ob-
served in Italy. This means that insurance is not a stabilizing
tool in France while it reduces income risk in Italy.
Considering inputs, we observe that both pesticides and fer-
tilizers contribute to increasing crop income volatility over the
period. This reinforces the results of the first model, inputs be-
ing used to boost the production rather than to reduce risk. 
Some structural aspects are common to French and Italian
farms; belonging to a group of farms (a legal form) permits a
reduction in the volatility of crop income. Farm size plays an
ambivalent role: for small farms, the larger the size, the higher
the volatility while for larger farms, the greater their size, the
lower the level of volatility we encountered. Volatility in crop
income also depends on location. Both in France and in Italy,
farms located in less-favoured areas have less volatile returns
than those elsewhere.
Weather conditions are a natural source of crop income volatil-
ity. In both France and Italy higher temperatures lead to higher
volatility. In France, we also noted that higher rainfall leads to
lower volatility while the opposite effect was noted in Italy.
Finally, we observed a time effect in France. The type of pro-
duction also leads to variable effects that depend upon the farm
ETO. Wine growing is less volatile than either market gardening
or field-scale crops in France. We do not find such effects in Italy.
5. Conclusion
Despite the relevance and topicality of agricultural income
volatility in the European Union, a few studies have been
drawn to measure the consequences of the use of risk man-
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Table 5 - Linear regressions explaining the volatility of crop income.
Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: own elaboration, FADN 2003-2007.
agement tools until now. This paper is also intended to under-
stand which factors might explain crop income volatility and
its variation. More specifically, the principal aim of this paper
was to measure the extent to which direct payments and crop
insurance could significantly reduce crop income volatility in
two major countries of the EU, France and Italy. 
To address these research topics, we set up a typology of
risk management tools taking into account their objective in
terms of return and volatility and the dynamics of these tools.
We then used an original dataset drawn up from the Farm Ac-
countancy Data Network (FADN) for farmers in France and
Italy from 2003 to 2007, representing 47,775 observations. To
carry out our analysis, we estimated several econometric
models in order to assess the main dimensions and the dy-
namics of crop income volatility.
Our analysis clearly questions the efficiency of structural
policies aimed at securing and stabilizing farmers’ incomes.
Despite similar institutional systems, the results between the
two countries are contrasting. This reflects differences in ex-
posure to volatility and risk management practices. Italian
farms are smaller than the French ones and therefore more ex-
posed to changes in their income. As a result, they use a larg-
er range of tools to increase their income (EU payments, crop
insurance) and reduce its volatility (crop insurance, inputs).
Despite some differences depending on the specialization of
the farms in question, it appears that these tools manage to sta-
bilize crop income over the years.
French farms exhibit a different behaviour. As the mean size
of their farms is larger than their Italian counterparts’, they are
able to substitute EU payments with production. However,
this decision is counterbalanced by farmers, who, at the same
time, use other risk management instruments such as inputs
(fertilizers and pesticides) and take out crop insurance. This
combination of tools appears beneficial for the farmer as it
eventually results in increased income. Yet this strategy tends
to enhance risk: income volatility is much higher for French
farms than for the Italian ones.
Variables related to the farm manager (age, education) and
to the financial situation of the farm (leverage) are not signif-
icant, revealing that volatility mainly depends on the produc-
tion conditions found on the farm. In addition to EU payments
and insurance, climate and specialization play a significant
role in crop income volatility. For instance, wine growing in-
curs less volatility than other crops in France.
These contrasted results reveal that risk management tools
can clearly be counterproductive. EU payments, insurance or
input use may, in certain circumstances, be risk-enhancing
tools. In terms of public policies, there is a powerful need to
target each instrument to the location of the farm in question
and to its production in order to verify its appropriate use.
This question is even more problematic when one considers
the CAP reform which plans to promote a global stabilization
tool at the farm scale (Meuwissenet al., 2011).
Therefore, it would be of interest to confirm the validity of
our results over a longer timescale. Taking into account annu-
al data also restricts the scope of the analysis to the balance
sheet of the farm. An access to additional variables such as the
details covering production (prices and quantities) might offer
a more precise analysis of crop income volatility. An alterna-
tive would be to develop models designed for each farm ETO.
Further research should address these issues in the light of the
current CAP reform.
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